2,700 research outputs found

    Special Education Teacher Turnover & School Leadership

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    Turnover and retention among special education teachers (SETs) continues to be a problem for many school districts. Studies suggest that the leadership approach of school leaders is a key factor influencing SETs’ decision to stay or leave their jobs. This qualitative phenomenological case study was designed to gain a better understanding of eight SETs’ experiences with their school leadership. In-depth one-to-one interviews, focus group interviews, and participant journaling were employed to collect rich narratives of SETs’ lived experiences. The data gathered from this study clearly showed that servant leadership, in which leaders are attuned to the emotional and professional needs of their followers, fostered strong leader-member exchange (LMX). Thus, selfless, relational, and holistic leadership behaviors affected SETs’ workplace experiences and influenced their workplace longevity

    A Comparison of Approaches to Mitigate Hypothetical Bias

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    We compare two approaches to mitigating hypothetical bias. The study design includes three treatments: an actual payment treatment, a contingent valuation (CV) treatment with a follow-up certainty question, and a CV treatment with a cheap talk script. Our results suggest that both the follow-up certainty treatment and the cheap talk treatment produce willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates consistent with the actual payment treatment. However, the follow-up certainty treatment provides response distributions at all offer amounts that are statistically similar to the actual payment treatment, while the cheap talk treatment provides similar responses only at some offer amounts. Furthermore, the cheap talk treatment is effective only for inexperienced individuals. We conclude that the follow-up certainty approach is more consistent than the cheap talk approach for eliminating hypothetical bias.contingent valuation, hypothetical bias, follow-up certainty, cheap talk, nonmarket valuation, Environmental Economics and Policy, Public Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

    Critical Applications and Proposals for Improvement of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act

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    The problems inherent in interstate child and spousal support enforcement have been lamented for at least a half century. The federal and state governments have taken numerous steps to enhance interstate establishment and collection of support. Two of the latest steps in this process were the 1992 promulgation of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ( UIFSA ) and the 1994 adoption of the federal Full Faith and Credit For Child Support Orders Act ( FFCCSOA ). The 1996 federal welfare reform bill\u27 affected both of these statutes by requiring the states to pass UIFSA by January 1, 1998 and by amending FFCCSOA to achieve greater consistency with UIFSA. Part I of this Article presents several hypothetical fact patterns that illustrate recurring problems in interstate support cases and applies UIFSA and FFCCSOA to each pattern. This Part identifies several scenarios where the application of these statutes generates conflicting or inequitable results and suggests possible solutions based upon principles of statutory interpretation, existing case law, and public policy considerations. Part II of this Article, based upon these applications of the statutes, proposes clarifying amendments to each

    See No Evil - The Role of the Directed Trustee under ERISA

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    Just before ERISA\u27s passage, Congress added a provision allowing a sponsoring employer to use a named fiduciary – usually one or more of the employer\u27s officers – to direct the trustee. In that case, the trustee is to be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this Act. Such a trustee is commonly called a directed trustee. After ERISA became law, commentators immediately observed that section 403(a)(1) generated more questions than answers. For instance, is a directed trustee a fiduciary at all? Does the directed trustee have a duty to investigate the named fiduciary\u27s direction to ascertain that it is proper, made in accordance with the terms of the plan, and not contrary to ERISA? If so, how intensive must the investigation be? Can a named fiduciary contractually bind the trust to make an investment without the directed trustee\u27s prior knowledge or approval? Over the past two decades, federal courts\u27 answers to these questions have usually been dead wrong or hopelessly unclear. Congress intended generally for ERISA to strengthen the fiduciary standards of the common law of trusts. Ironically, the courts have interpreted ERISA – usually unwittingly – to weaken those standards when applied to directed trustees. This article will argue that the directed trustee is always an ERISA fiduciary subject to the obligations – and rights – that term implies. ERISA\u27s language, structure, expressed public policy, and legislative history, confirmed by Department of Labor ( DOL ) interpretations, strongly support this result. In addition, I will argue that the directed trustee necessarily has some duty to investigate the named fiduciary\u27s directions if the trustee is to fulfill section 403(a)(1)\u27s requirements and avoid co-fiduciary liability. How broad and intensive this investigation should be depends on the specific direction, its relative impact on the plan, and whether the directed trustee itself has a conflict of interest with respect to the direction. Part II briefly suggests the empirical importance of directed trustee liability. Part III examines ERISA\u27s trust requirement, the three ways in which the trustee can be relieved of its exclusive authority over plan assets (via an investment manager, a named fiduciary\u27s directions, or participant control), and the consequences of each of these three means for trustee liability. Part IV analyzes ERISA\u27s legislative history pertaining to directed trustees. Part V collects DOL pronouncements relating to directed trustees. Part VI compares ERISA\u27s treatment of directed trustees to the view prevailing under the state common law of trusts. Part VII critiques the federal common law of directed trustees as developed in the past two decades under ERISA. Finally, Part VIII offers suggestions for improving the federal common law to better protect plan assets

    Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: The Illusory “No-Injury Class” Reaches the Supreme Court

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    The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and three other cases involving class actions in the October 2015 term could be a bad sign for those who think the class action should remain a viable species of private regulation. The grant of certiorari in Spokeo is also a bad sign for those who think Congress should be able to enact statutes regulating businesses’ behavior for the public good—the petitioner, Spokeo, and its army of business amici are urging the Court to cut the legs out from under many such statutes. Corporate litigation activists such as the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center continue to press a well-orchestrated attack against the class action and plaintiffs’ class-action lawyers by brilliantly conceiving a new catchphrase: the “no-injury” class. The attack is proceeding in Congress, in the federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and in lower courts nationwide. But corporate-lawyer activists have had the most success against class actions in the Supreme Court, the battlefield where Spokeo is now being fought. There are two primary manifestations of the “no-injury class” argument. The first is the idea that a class should not be certified if it includes some members who, at the end of the day, turn out not to have suffered the harm that the class representatives are complaining about. This is the second Question Presented (“QP”) in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo. Spokeo invokes the second manifestation of the “no-injury class.” that the class representative’s “only” alleged harm is the violation of a regulatory statute, which is not the “injury in fact” required for Article III standing. Petitioner Spokeo phrases the QP in the Supreme Court as, “Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.
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